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Abstract In this paper I intend to focus on the transparency account of picture 
perception, according to which picture perception is, in many cases at least, a species 
of perception of transparency that displays a transparency effect even in absence of 
physical transparency. Basically, I want to show that this account is not correct. For 
not only it does not rightly capture the phenomenology of picture perception, but 
also, and more importantly, it does not explain that perception, since picture 
perception is necessary for a transparency effect. Yet this criticism does not 
altogether intend to deny that, as to picture perception, the transparency account has 
some insights that must be kept in any good account of such a perception: namely, 
the fact that picture perception involves an element of aware illusoriness and the fact 
that it brings in a sort of transfiguration of the pictorial vehicle per se, the physical 
basis of a picture, into something that has a pictorial value. 
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0. Introduction 
In this paper I intend to focus on the transparency account of picture perception, 
according to which picture perception is, in many cases at least, a species of 
perception of transparency that displays a transparency effect even in absence of 
physical transparency. Basically, I want to show that this account is not correct. For 
not only it does not rightly capture the phenomenology of picture perception, but 
also, and more importantly, it does not explain that perception, since picture 
perception is necessary for a transparency effect. Yet this criticism does not 
altogether intend to deny that, as to picture perception, the transparency account has 
some insights that must be kept in any good account of such a perception: namely, 
the fact that picture perception involves an element of aware illusoriness and the fact 
that it brings in a sort of transfiguration of the pictorial vehicle per se, the physical 
basis of a picture, into something that has a pictorial value. 
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1. Picture Perception Is a Perception of Transparency 
The idea that a picture is like a window open to its subject, i.e., what the picture 
presents1, is an old-fashioned one, tracing back at least to Leonbattista Alberti’s De 
pictura. The gist of this idea is that a picture is like a transparent medium that lets 
one see its subject through it. Yet how can it be more than a mere metaphor as far as 
so-called opaque pictures, paintings first of all, are concerned; namely, those pictures 
that, following Walton (1984), are linked to their subjects by a basically intentional 
relation? Even if by chance the subject of an opaque picture laid behind that picture, 
there would be no relation between it and that picture that would enable the former to 
be seen through the latter. Physically speaking, the vehicle of that picture, i.e., its 
physical basis, is no transparent medium. For some people, the idea can be rendered 
true by those pictures that (in a possibly different sense) are called transparent 
pictures, static and dynamic photographs first of all; namely, those pictures which, 
according to Walton (1984) again, are linked to their subjects by a basically causal 
relation. Yet even such pictures do not work as transparent media. Even when the 
subject of a transparent picture lies behind it so as to have a direct causal 
responsibility in its production, in its being physically opaque that picture is not a 
transparent medium that allows that subject to be seen through it. Just as opaque 
pictures, they visually occlude what lies behind them, a fortiori their subjects. 
Yet some other people believe that, both in the case of transparent and in the case of 
opaque pictures, picture perception may be taken to be a species of perception of 
transparency. In general, as the Italian psychologist Fabio Metelli has originally 
shown, physical transparency is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of 
phenomenal transparency. On the one hand, physically transparent things, e.g. air, 
may not be perceived transparently: objects located in outer space are not e.g. seen 
through air. On the other hand, also physically opaque things may prompt a 
perception of transparency (Cf. METELLI 1974: 91). For instance, in the 
paradigmatic case Metelli provides, the following triangular body is physically 
opaque, yet one sees (the relevant portion of) a spiral through it, as if that body were 
a transparent layer (or even (in this case) the other way around, that is, the spiral 
plays the role of the physically opaque body through which one however sees a 
triangular body)2. 
                                                          
1 I say “presents” rather than “depicts” in order to take into account also accidental or fortuitous 
images (CUTTING-MASSIRONI 1998), that is, items that have a figurative value even though they 
have not been construed by anyone in order to represent something. Those images indeed present 
something without also depicting it. Famous examples of images of this kind are faces seen in rocks, 
battles seen in marble veins, animals seen in clouds. Cf. WOLLHEIM 19802, 1987. To be sure, 
however, Newall 2015: 133 does not want to take them into consideration. 
2 Cf. METELLI (1974: 90). For the reasons why in this case phenomenal transparency may go both 
ways, see CASATI 2009, SAYIM and CAVANAGH 2011. 
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 Fig. 1 
Now, the above people say, this transparency effect holds true of pictures as well, at 
least in many cases. Although they are physically opaque, they may surely be 
phenomenally captured via a perception of transparency, in which one sees their 
subjects as lying behind them, thereby making their vehicles a sort of transparent 
layer (KULVICKI 2009, NEWALL 2011, 2015). Now granted, that perception of 
transparency is a kind of seeing-as perception, hence it is not veridical. In 
entertaining that perception, one does not see that its subject lies behind the picture, 
one merely sees the subject as so lying even if it does not so lie. Yet moreover, that 
seeing-as remains modal. One does not see the subject of a picture as lying behind it 
amodally, as if the picture were something that occludes the subject. Instead, one 
sees the subject as through the picture. Finally, the nonveridicality of such a 
perception is well known to its bearer, insofar as she is also aware of the physical 
opacity of the picture. Now, this aware illusoriness also accompanies perception of 
transparency in general. For instance, in the aforementioned Metelli paradigmatic 
case, it is not the case that the spiral modally seen behind the triangular body lies so 
behind, as the perceiver well knows. Thus, one may well say that, in many cases at 
least, picture perception – the perception of a picture as presenting another item, its 
subject – is a species of perception of transparency. 
A consequence of Kulvicki’s account seems to be that the seeing-as perception in 
question is not only nonveridical, it also has a sort of impossibility: a nomological 
impossibility. For, although it is a modal perception of transparency, that perception 
is accompanied by the perceptual awareness that the picture’s vehicle is physically 
opaque3. Yet in no nomologically possible world, one modally sees a subject through 
its physically opaque picture perceived as such4.  
In itself, I would say, this nomological impossibility is not per se particularly 
disquieting. There are other cases in which one entertains an impossible seeing-as 
perception, for instance when we see a regular triangular body as a Penrose triangle 
(Cf. PYLYSHYN 2003: 95). Yet Newall interestingly thinks that this undoubtedly 
problematic aspect of Kulvicki’s account can be amended if one dispenses with the 
idea that this perception of transparency is accompanied by a perception of the 
pictorial vehicle’s opacity. In Newall’s account, this latter perception does not go 
along with the perception of transparency that constitutes picture perception, but it is 
                                                          
3 «Seeing-in is a perceptual state in which an opaque object is experienced as being in front of another 
opaque object even though neither object is obscured by the other» (KULVICKI 2009: 394). 
4 Cf. NEWALL 2015: 136-137. Kulvicki himself seems to acknowledge this problem when he says 
«one cannot see through opaque objects, so the far object in such circumstances cannot be causally 
responsible for one’s experience of it in the proper manner» (KULVICKI 2009: 392).  
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rather a perception of that vehicle in isolation that alternates with that perception5. 
Thus, when one entertains the latter perception, one is aware of the vehicle’s opacity, 
yet this awareness is not perceptual. This result can be obtained by taking the 
inclusion of picture perception within perception of transparency substantively. For 
according to Newall, picture perception is qualified by the same sort of laws that 
according to Metelli qualify perception of transparency in general. In particular, this 
holds true of the so-called law of scission, which Metelli describes as follows: «with 
the perception of transparency the stimulus color splits into two different colors, 
which are called the scission colors. One of the scission colors goes to the 
transparent layer and the other to the surface of the figure below» (METELLI 1974: 
93). Take a transparent layer and juxtapose it on another object, let me call it the 
background object. This juxtaposition determines a certain stimulus color: this color 
is what is immediately grasped in the perception of transparency. Moreover, the 
stimulus color is split into two further colors, the scission colors, one that is ascribed 
to the layer itself, while the other is ascribed to the background object. Consider for 
instance the following figure. In seeing it, one has a perception of transparency 
insofar as, first, one sees a certain hue of dark gray where the circular body overlaps 
a crescent-shaped body, and second, that hue is split into a lighter gray of the 
overlapping body and in the black of the overlapped body (incidentally, since also in 
this case there is foreground-background reversibility, the circular body that is lighter 
gray may be the overlapped body and the crescent-shaped body that is black may be 
the overlapping body).  
 
 
Fig. 2 
 
Now, comments Newall, this also happens with many pictures: when we perceive 
them, we experience a scission in the visible properties of its vehicle that are still 
ascribed to that vehicle and those that are ascribed to its subject. E.g. if you have a 
sepia photograph, it is seen as having a blend of yellowish tones that are splitted in 
tonal properties that are ascribed to its subject and in yellow hues that are still 
ascribed to the photographic vehicle itself. Mutatis mutandis, the same happens with 
glossy photographs6. 
                                                          
5  Cf. NEWALL 2015: 143. In its being remindful of GOMBRICH (1960) position on picture 
perception, the fact the account appeals to this alternation justifies HOPKINS (2012) labeling it 
“Transparency Gombricheanism”. 
6 Cf. NEWALL (2015: 145-146). Another possibly more convincing case may be found in TAYLOR 
(2015), the case of an aged depiction that has wired to yellow, yet we still see a nonyellow subject in 
it. I will discuss such a case later. For Newall, pictures that are not so seen are, on the one hand, 
trompe l’oeils and naturalistic pictures, in which all the visible properties of the picture are ascribed to 
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For Newall, this account of picture perception has the merit that it may show up to 
what extent sense picture perception is twofold, as Wollheim (19802), 1987, 1998 
originally maintained. As is well known, for Wollheim picture perception amounts to 
a sui generis kind of perception that he labeled seeing-in. Now, the qualifying feature 
of seeing-in is precisely its being the outcome of two pictorial folds, what Wollheim 
respectively labeled the configurational fold (CF), in which one perceives the 
picture’s vehicle, and the recognitional fold (RF), in which one perceives the 
picture’s subject. These folds are supposed to be inseparable; neither the perception 
of the vehicle in the CF nor the perception of the subject in the RF is the same as 
their respective perception in isolation (Cf. WOLLHEIM 1987: 46). One may 
moreover say that the RF depends on the CF (Cf. HOPKINS 2008: 150). These 
precisifications notwithstanding, many people have found this characterization of 
picture perception extremely elusive. Basically, it is not clear how those folds 
interact, both from the point of view of their phenomenal character (are they both 
perceptual states?) and from the point of view of their content (how can an integrated 
mental state come out of folds whose contents seem to mobilize many features that 
contradict each other, starting from the vehicle’s being flat and the subject’s being 
not such?)7. Now, says Newall, if (in many cases at least) picture perception amounts 
to a species of perception of transparency, one may account for its twofoldness in a 
different way. For one may say that its twofoldness is explained by its being a 
perception of transparency: in it, one perceives the picture’s subject through 
perceiving the picture’s vehicle, as in any perception of transparency (Cf. NEWALL 
2015: 138). In a nutshell, seeing-in is, at least in many cases, a form of seeing-
through. 
 
 
2. The Transparency Account of Picture Perception Does Not Work 
Phenomenologically  
Though fascinating, this account of picture perception is surely problematic. For one, 
Hopkins (2012) has maintained that it does not work, basically because it is unable to 
account for the fact that, unlike perception of transparency, in picture perception, 
while the picture’s vehicle may be given under many different perspectives, the 
picture’s subject is given just under one such perspective. This is what Wollheim 
originally described as a phenomenon of perceptual constancy (Cf. WOLLHEIM 
19802: 215- 216).  
In 2015, Newall has tried to cope with this objection, by questioning whether this 
sort of perceptual constancy really occurs in picture perception (Cf. NEWALL 2015: 
135). To be sure, I wonder whether Newall provides sufficient evidence on this 
concern8. Yet my aim here is not to evaluate whether Newall satisfactorily replies to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the picture’s subject, and on the other hand, those pictures whose visible properties remain all 
ascribed to the picture’s vehicle (NEWALL 2015: 143-144). To be sure, for Newall also picture 
perceptions that are affected by imbrication, the phenomenon in which features of the picture’s 
vehicle are attributed to the picture’s subject, cannot be accounted for in terms of perception of 
transparency (Ivi: 148, 154). Yet he claims that his account also explains how such a phenomenon, 
which is very close to what is normally called inflected seeing-in, may occur (Ivi: 151-154). 
7 For a review of these problems cf. e.g. HOPKINS 2010, 2012. 
8 In VOLTOLINI 2014, I have precisely tried to show that the impression of being followed by the 
pictorial subject’s eyes Newall appeals to in order to face Hopkins’ objection is instead to be 
accounted for precisely in terms of such a perceptual constancy. 
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Hopkins’ objection. For even if this were the case, it still seems to me that the 
transparency account does not capture the phenomenology of picture perception 
correctly.  
To begin with, picture perception is not the, even knowingly illusory, modal 
perception of something, i.e., the picture’s subject, as lying behind something else, 
i.e., the picture’s vehicle – in Hopkins’ terms, the perception that (i) represents P (the 
picture’s vehicle) as at distance δ1 from one’s point of view, and (ii) represents O 
(the picture’s subject) as at distance δ2 from one’s point of view, where δ1≠ δ2 (Cf. 
HOPKINS 2012: 656). To begin with, the picture’s subject amounts to a three-
dimensional scene whose elements are differently located as to their depth in space, 
so that the bearer of the relevant picture perception sees them as having such 
different locations. As Wollheim originally grasped: «I discern something standing 
out in front of, or (in certain cases) receding behind, something else» (1987: 46). 
This remark of Wollheim is often misunderstood, as if he were saying that one sees 
the picture’s vehicle as (normally) standing out in front of the picture’s subject9. Yet 
for him, the terms of that spatial relation are not the vehicle and the subject, but 
rather elements within the picture’s subject as a whole three-dimensional scene, what 
according to him is grasped in the RF of picture perception, as the following 
quotation by him clearly shows. In describing his own perception of Edouard 
Manet’s Emilie Ambre, he reprises the aforementioned sentence by so expanding it: 
«my perception is twofold in that I simultaneously am visually aware of the marked 
surface and experience something in front of, or behind, something else – in this 
case, a woman in a hat standing in front of a clump of trees» (WOLLHEIM 2003a: 
3, my italics). If this is the case, moreover, the spatial relation to the picture’s vehicle 
of the elements of the scene constituting the picture’s subject is so multifarious that it 
cannot be perceived as if the vehicle were a transparent layer. While some elements 
of the picture’s subject are (knowingly illusorily, as we will immediately see) seen as 
lying behind the picture’s vehicle, some other such elements are (again, knowingly 
illusorily) seen as located precisely where the picture’s vehicle is, if not even in front 
of them! Indeed, the phenomenological situation at stake as to the perception of that 
scene does not directly involve the picture’s vehicle. Instead, on the basis of the fact 
that we knowingly veridically see the picture’s vehicle, in merely starting in our 
perception of that scene from the same area in which we knowingly veridically see 
the vehicle, we also and eo ipso knowingly illusorily see the picture’s subject, as 
expanding normally behind, yet sometimes (also) in front of, that very area. 
The first option – progressive recession and colocation – is given for example in the 
following picture presenting an Italian village. 
 
                                                          
9 For this alternative interpretation cf. e.g. HYMAN (2006: 133), who however admits that also the 
present interpretation is viable. We will however immediately see that for Wollheim himself the 
present interpretation is the only correct one. 
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Fig. 3: personal reproduction 
 
In this case, as to the whole scene we knowingly illusorily see in our picture 
perception, we (knowingly illusorily) see the open window as being a bit further 
behind the location where the picture’s vehicle is and is knowingly veridically seen 
to be, the flowers as being a bit more further behind, and the houses belonging to this 
Italian village as being even further behind; yet the curtains are seen as being 
precisely where the picture’s vehicle is and is knowingly veridically seen to be. The 
second option (admittedly rarer than the first one) – progressive regression, 
colocation and progressive protrusion – is given for example in this famous picture 
by Pere Borrell del Caso, Escaping Criticism. 
 
 
Fig. 410  
 
In this case, as to the whole scene we knowingly illusorily see in our picture 
perception, we (knowingly illusorily) see the left leg of the boy the picture presents 
as behind the location where the canvas is and is knowingly veridically seen to be, 
whereas his torso is (knowingly illusorily) seen in that very location. Finally, his 
head, his left hand and his right foot are (knowingly illusorily) seen as in front of it, 
in order to convey the overall impression that the boy is getting out of the picture. 
Both cases, in particularly the second one, show that the phenomenology of picture 
perception is not that of a perception of transparency. For even if one admits that 
there is a relation between the location where the picture’s vehicle is knowingly 
veridically seen to be and the location where the picture’s subject is knowingly 
illusorily seen to be, this is not a relation perceived in picture perception, as the 
transparency account instead predicts. 
                                                          
10 https://www.tumblr.com/search/pere+borrell+del+caso 
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To be sure, Newall is well aware of cases belonging to the second option (Cf. 
NEWALL 2015: 134, 150-151). However, he holds that they provide no 
counterexample to his account, for they simply reverse the transparency order. For in 
them it is the picture’s vehicle (‘s surface) that is seen through (the relevant part of) 
the picture’s subject: «in these cases, rather than seeing the subject matter through 
the seemingly transparent picture surface, we see the surface through the seemingly 
transparent subject matter» (NEWALL 2015: 151). Yet, as I have tried to show, in 
knowingly illusorily perceiving certain spatial relations, even in such cases the 
picture’s vehicle is out of focus. Those spatial relations instead qualify the three-
dimensional scene that constitutes the picture’s subject. A part of the scene 
constituting the picture’s subject is knowingly illusorily seen before some other of its 
parts, both those which are ascribed a location that coincides with that in which the 
picture’s vehicle is knowingly veridically seen to be and those which are ascribed a 
location behind. If we come back to Escaping Criticism, what is (knowingly 
illusorily) seen behind (amodally, by the way) the boy’s left hand is a frame that 
belongs to the picture’s subject, qua the sort of window from which the boy tries to 
get out, not the frame of the picture’s vehicle (we may well take that vehicle as 
frameless)! 
Yet differences in phenomenology between picture perception and perception of 
transparency do not end here, as we will now see. As a consequence of its abiding by 
the law of scission, perception of transparency is such that in it one immediately 
perceives a blend, the stimulus color, which depends on the colors that the 
transparent layer and the background object respectively possess. Actually, these are 
the very scission colors; as Metelli says, «when a pair of scission colors are mixed, 
they re-create the stimulus color» (1974: 93). Indeed, if such colors change, then the 
transparency effect changes as well. On the one hand, for example, the darker is the 
color of the background object, the darker grey is the stimulus color; the lighter is the 
former, the lighter gray is the latter (Cf. METELLI 1974: 95, 98). On the other hand, 
for example, the transparency effect is increased when the difference between the 
dark and light gray in the colors of the central regions belonging to the transparent 
layer is increased as well (Cf. ivi: 96, 98.). 
Yet picture perception hardly exhibits such a dependence. Let us accept for 
argument’s sake that the colors the picture’s vehicle is ascribed allegedly in virtue of 
the scission operation determine the colors the vehicle has before such an 
operation11. Yet the colors the picture’s subject is ascribed allegedly in virtue of the 
scission operation do not determine the colors that one sees in the picture’s vehicle 
before that operation. This is the moral one can draw from Wollheim’s reflections on 
Henry Matisse’s The Green Stripe: «When Matisse painted a stroke of green down 
his wife’s face, he was not representing a woman who had a green line down her 
face» (WOLLHEIM 2003b: 143). Indeed in that painting, Madame Matisse is not 
seen as a sort of alien having such a stripe on her face, but is seen as having the 
different colors of her face’s elements (say, the fleshy color of her front, the black 
colors of her conjoining eyebrows, the fleshy color again of her nose). Yet the 
corresponding region of its vehicle is seen overall green. One may strengthen this 
example by pointing to other similar and perhaps more evident cases. As 
Wittgenstein remarked, in visually facing a black and white photo of a boy, we do 
                                                          
11 This is however not to be taken for granted. For seeing the picture’s vehicle within a picture 
perception may alter the colors that it is seen to have when it is seen is isolation in such a way that 
there is no dependence of the former colors on the latter ones. 
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not see a black-and-white exotic individual, but rather a normal fleshy-colored 
human being (Cf. WITTGENSTEIN 1977, III § 117).   
To be sure, one might disagree on that in seeing the Matisse painting, an alien who 
has a green line down her face is not somehow visually present, just as one may 
reply that in seeing a black and white picture of persons, one is not seeing them as 
having fleshy colors, but rather as having different hues of gray12. In actual fact, 
however, Newall would hardly endorse that disagreement: «I take it that a sepia-
toned photograph, despite its coloration, will usually not occasion the experience of 
yellowish subject matter» (NEWALL 2015: 145). Quite reasonably, I would say, 
from his point of view. For if that were the case, on behalf of the transparency 
account one would be forced to say that, when a picture’s vehicle changes its colors 
because, say, of some physical process, we see its subject as changing its colors as 
well. Yet this is hardly the case. If by getting older a black and white photo of the 
Eiffel Tower turns into a sepia one, we do not see its subject as changing its colors as 
well. 
A third case phenomenologically problematic for the transparency account obtains 
when an ordinary perception of transparency somehow interacts with a picture 
perception. This situation occurs when a transparent layer is also a picture of a 
subject different from its background object, as in this case of glasses that present 
human silhouettes different from the portions of the table that are respectively seen 
through the glasses themselves. 
 
 
Fig. 5 personal reproduction 
 
For Newall, this is only a case of a threefold rather than a twofold perception, in 
which one first sees (a), the picture’s vehicle (a glass), then in the vehicle she sees 
(b), the picture’s subject (a human silhouette), and finally, through the vehicle itself, 
in that subject she sees (c), a further background object (a certain portion of the table 
seen through that glass) (Cf. NEWALL 2015: 149). 
Yet in this situation, this double seeing-in account again fails to grasp the 
phenomenology of the case. Granted, it perfectly fits another case that as a matter of 
fact Newall himself recalls and that, pace Newall himself (Cf. 2015: 150), may 
legitimately be considered a case of threefold seeing-in: namely, a case of nested 
seeing-in. In such a case, one indeed sees a second-order picture’s subject in a nested 
picture that belongs to the first-order subject seen, along with other things, in the 
nesting picture’s overall vehicle. For instance in Edgar Degas’ Sulking, we see a 
                                                          
12 Cf. NANAY (2016: 48- 49, 56- 57, 63). See also NANAY 2017. 
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woman and a man standing in front of a picture in which one can see additional items 
(namely, many racing horses). 
Yet in our case, the further background object (c) is (knowingly veridically) seen to 
lie behind the picture’s transparent vehicle (a); it would be still so seen even if that 
vehicle were not the physical basis of a picture of something else, but just a 
transparent object like any other (i.e., if it were something that bears no marks 
having a pictorial reading). Thus on the one hand, the picture’s subject (b) is seen 
(knowingly illusorily) as constituting a three-dimensional scene starting exactly from 
where (a) lies, hence as lying partly where the picture’s vehicle (a) is and partly 
where the background object (c) is, while on the other hand, (c) is not seen in that 
picture’s subject (b), it is merely seen through (a); in this respect, the marks that 
feature (b) just count as a bunch of opaque dots scattered on (a) that weaken (a)’s 
transparency effect, just as in a dirty window pane. In a nutshell, 
phenomenologically speaking, the fact that an object counts as a transparent layer for 
a background object and the fact that that very object counts as a picture that presents 
another subject point towards different directions. 
Let me take stock. Although the list of problematic cases may not have been already 
exhausted, I think that the above three cases – differences in the perception of spatial 
depth-involving relations affecting the picture’s subject that do not pass through the 
perception of the picture’s vehicle; independence of the perception of the pictorial 
elements from the perception of the picture’s vehicle taken in isolation; 
independence of the perception of the background object from the perception of a 
picture’s subject additionally seen in a transparent yet pictorial layer – abundantly 
show that the phenomenology of picture perception is not an instance of a perception 
of transparency of the sort Metelli appealed to, as Newall instead believes. In a 
slogan, if picture perception is (at least a form of) seeing-in as Wollheim repeatedly 
said, seeing-in is no seeing-through. 
 
 
3. Perception of Transparency Does Not Explain Picture Perception 
Yet there is a fourth case that shows not only that the transparency account does not 
capture the phenomenology of picture perception correctly, but also that perception 
of transparency does not explain picture perception, for things go the other way 
round: the transparency effect that perception of transparency exhibits depends on 
that perception being pictorial. Let us go back to the Metelli paradigmatic case that 
is encharged to show that physical transparency is not a necessary condition for 
perception of transparency. In that case, as we saw before, we modally see a spiral as 
lying behind a triangular body, even if that perception is not veridical for the spiral 
does not so lie. Yet in this case what we really see as a whole is a picture that 
presents a scene involving physical transparency as its subject13. In that picture, in 
virtue of (knowingly veridically) seeing its vehicle, we grasp its subject, a certain 
three-dimensional scene, in which we further modally (yet knowingly illusorily) see 
a certain element of that scene, the spiral, as lying behind another element of the 
scene, the triangular body. In other terms, the transparency effect that occurs in such 
a case perceptually concerns just the elements in picture perception that constitute 
the picture’s subject, but not the picture perception as a whole that also comprises 
                                                          
13 CASATI (2009: 330) describes such cases as cases of pictorial transparency. See also SAYIM and 
CAVANAGH (2011: 681). 
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one’s seeing the picture’s vehicle14. In Wollheim’s terms, the transparency effect at 
stake here occurs in the recognitional fold (RF) of picture perception but not in its 
configurational fold (CF), which along with the RF determines picture perception as 
a whole. As a consequence, once again, perception of transparency does not capture 
the phenomenology of picture perception as a whole. For one’s entertaining a 
perception of transparency in the Metelli paradigmatic case is included in an overall 
picture perception that comprises not only the transparency effect, but also one’s 
seeing the vehicle itself of the picture that prompts such an effect.  
To better see this point, just consider how it would make a phenomenological 
difference to be firstly deluded by the Metelli paradigmatic case as if it worked as a 
trompe l’oeil, and to secondly realize that it is a picture. We would still grasp its 
transparency effect, but we would also see the vehicle that originally escaped our 
perceptual awareness. Firstly, we would have a delusion of physical transparence, as 
when we seem to see as transparent an object that is not such. Yet secondly, once we 
realized that we were facing a picture, we would have perception of transparency 
without physical transparency precisely because that perception would be embedded 
in a picture perception. Thus as a further result, all this shows that perception of 
transparency does not suffice for picture perception, for it is at most an element that 
figures within it. 
Of course, one might wonder whether, over and above the cases Metelli pointed out, 
there are other cases of perceptual transparency without physical transparency that 
are not perception of pictures as a whole. For instance, Newall holds that shadows 
are also perceived as transparent15. In actual fact, it is very controversial whether 
shadows elicit a perception of transparency16. Even if this were the case, however, 
we must recall that, as we know from Plato onwards, in most cases at least shadows 
are again a case of pictures (transparent pictures, in Walton’s account)17. Hence their 
perception is again a case of pictorial perception. Alternatively, one may have a mere 
perception of transparency in cases of texture transparency, as in the following 
example by Patrick Cavanagh and Takeo Watanabe that Newall himself reports, 
when dotted lines in one direction are overlapped by dotted lines in another 
direction18.   
 
                                                          
14 Examples here can be multiplied. The transparency effect that occurs in the case of lightness 
illusion, e.g. when in a figure photometrically identical disks on light and dark surrounds are such that 
«the disks on the light surround appear as uniformly black objects visible behind a semi-transparent, 
light haze, whereas the disks on the dark surround appear as uniformly white objects visible behind a 
semi-transparent, dark haze» does not occur when «simultaneously experiencing the disks as textured 
patches on a 2D surface, that is, as co-planar with their surround» (BRISCOE 2017:14). 
15 Cf. NEWALL 2015: 137. Newall refers for this thesis to CAVANAGH 2005. The thesis surely 
traces back to ARNHEIM (1974: 309-310). 
16 For a very convincing denial of the thesis, cf. CASATI 2009. 
17 It is however hard to allow a pictorial form of transparency for shadows. For what is seen in a 
shadow is a three-dimensional scene whose main element protrudes from its background, as is shown 
by the fact that once one draws the boundary of a shadow that elicits this emergence, the shadow is no 
longer seen as such (cf. CASATI 2009). And we have seen that pictures whose subject is 
characterized by such a protrusion hardly elicit a perception of transparency. 
18 Cf. NEWALL (2015: 140). Newall’s reference is to WATANABE and CAVANAGH 1996. 
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Fig. 6 
 
Yet once again, this is a case of an overall perception of an admittedly abstract 
picture that yet displays seeing-in. The transparency effect indeed occurs in the RF of 
that perception as featuring a spatial depth-involving relation among the elements 
constituting that picture’s subject19. All in all, therefore, as far as I can see, there is 
no case of a mere perception of transparency to which picture perception may be 
equated that is not again embedded in a picture perception. 
 
 
4. A Provisional Moral 
So far, I hope to have shown that interpreting picture perception as a species of 
perception of transparency does not work. Does this show that we have to altogether 
reject the transparency account of picture perception? Not quite. In the course of this 
scrutiny, we have seen that there are at least two elements in this account that any 
good account of picture perception must take into consideration. 
First, there definitely is a nonveridicality element in picture perception. The 
transparency account holds that this nonveridicality amounts to the fact that we 
modally see the picture’s subject as lying behind the picture’s vehicle, but this has 
turned out not to be correct. Instead, what seems to be correct is that we see the 
picture’s subject as lying in a space that begins where also the vehicle is located 
while however stretching in both directions – normally just in a receding direction, 
but sometimes also in a protruding direction. As we however knowingly veridically 
also see the vehicle to be located in a certain area of that space, not only that way of 
seeing the subject as so located is nonveridical, but we also know that this is the case. 
If we frame the perception of the picture’s subject in Wollheimian terms, we can say 
that the RF of picture perception consists in the knowingly illusory perception of the 
picture’s vehicle as the picture’s subject20, as if the latter were located in the same 
space as the former, by merely partly (seemingly) sharing the same locations in that 
space.  
Second, in virtue of the law of scission, one may describe the transparency effect as 
the transfiguration of the stimulus color into the scission colors of the transparent 
layer and of the background object respectively, since the former color is a blend of 
the latter ones. Now, we have seen that, pace Newall, no such effect occurs in picture 
                                                          
19  In 1987, p. 62, WOLLHEIM allows for seeing-in experiences of abstract pictures. NEWALL 
himself (2015: 137) agrees with him on this point. See also GAIGER (2008: 61-62). 
20 As LEVINSON (1998: 229) originally suggested. I have exploited and expanded this suggestion in 
my VOLTOLINI (2015, chap. 6). 
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perception. Yet what sounds correct of the transparency account is that, once grasped 
in a picture perception, the picture’s vehicle does undergo a transfiguration insofar as 
it is no longer perceived as it is perceived when it is grasped in isolation, as a mere 
physical object among others having no pictorial value. Indeed, in picture perception 
the picture’s vehicle must be perceived in such a way that allows the picture’s 
subject to perceptually emerge precisely in terms of the above knowingly illusory 
perception. As a result, in such a perception also the picture’s subject undergoes a 
transfiguration: once grasped in a pictorial perception, the picture’s subject is no 
longer perceived as it is when it is perceived face-to-face.  
This last reflection brings me to the following, final, remarks. First of all, Wollheim 
himself presumably had this sort of transfiguration in mind when he said, as we have 
seen before, that the CF and the RF of the distinctive seeing-in experience picture 
perception amounts to are inseparable. Moreover, that transfiguration shows that 
both Gombrich and Wollheim were right when they respectively said that vehicle 
perception and picture perception are alternate and that vehicle perception and 
subject perception are inseparable. For, as Newall himself agrees on, in defending 
that alternation, Gombrich had in mind the perception of the vehicle in isolation; 
whereas, in stressing that inseparability, Wollheim had in mind the perception of a 
transfigurated vehicle. The former perception is definitely incompatible with picture 
perception: either one perceives the vehicle in isolation or one has a picture 
perception. Yet the latter perception is just a component of picture perception along 
with the perception of the picture’s subject. Thus, in this respect at least, 
Gombricheanism and Wollheimianism as to picture perception can be taken to be 
compatible (Cf. VOLTOLINI 2015, chap. 4). This was somehow acknowledged by 
Wollheim himself when he said «seeing y [the picture’s subject] in x may rest upon 
seeing x as y [a pictorial representation], but not for the same values of the variable 
y» (WOLLHEIM 19802: 226)21.  
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